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[1] The enduring value of the Constitution is the fundamental approach to
human rights transcending time and technology. The modern complexity
and variety of electronically stored information was unknown in the
eighteenth century, but the elemental due process concepts forged then can
be applied now. At some point, the accumulation of information
surpassed the boundaries of living witnesses and paper records. The
advent of computers and databases ushered in an entirely new order,1
giving rise to massive libraries of factual details and powerful
investigative tools. But electronically collected information sources are a
double-edged sword. Their accuracy and reliability are critical issues in
the hands of prosecutors and their accessibility a hard-won necessity in
preparing a defense.
[2] This article examines the use of computer databases and electronic
evidence from both standpoints. With limited guidance from federal and
state criminal discovery rules, the courts have had to rely on constitutional
principles and analogies to civil procedure when faced with database and
*

Director of Legal Information Services, New York State Defenders Association. J.D.,
Temple University School of Law, 1984; M.L.S. St. John's University, 1994; B.A.,
summa cum laude, St. John's University, 1981.
1
According to a study by the U.C. Berkeley School of Information Management and
Systems, the sum of “new” information stored electronically doubled between 1999 and
2000, to five exabytes (five followed by 18 zeroes) or the equivalent of 500,000 Libraries
of Congress. See Grant Gross, Study Documents Data Boom: Data Storage Has Doubled
During the Last Three Years, INFOWORLD, Oct. 28, 2003, available at http:
http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/10/28/HNstoragedoubles_1.html.
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electronic document discovery requests.2 A tension exists between the
government’s proprietary interest in preserving the sanctity of its
databases and the right of the defense to assail the accuracy of the
databases’ output or to use them as investigative tools. As the gold
standards of forensic science have come to be questioned,3 so too the
inviolability of government databases must be rethought.4 And the
defense’s right to prepare its case and receive a fair trial makes it
2

See generally Federal Judicial Center, Materials on Electronic Discovery: Civil
Litigation,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.nsf/inavge
neral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/196 (last visited Feb. 18, 2009)
(providing several links, articles, presentations, and other items of interest on ediscovery); The Sedona Conference, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/faq
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (stating that among the aims of this research and educational
institute is the advancement of electronic document retention and production). To
achieve these aims, the Sedona Conference specifically noted:
Working Group 1 was formed in Spring of 2002 and issued a public
comment version of The Sedona Principles addressing electronic
document production in March of 2003 - a month later, the Principles
were cited by the Federal Judicial Center’s Civil Rules Advisory
Committee Discovery Subcommittee as one of the reasons to focus on
possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this
area.
The Sedona Conference: What Have Working Groups Achieved so far in Contributing to
the Advancement of Law and Policy, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/faq
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
3
See generally Simon Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings
From Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004)
(arguing that forensic evidence has gained its legitimacy through legal acceptance rather
than scientific validity); Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and
Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2
(2005) (arguing that scientific problems should render firearms and toolmark
identification inadmissible in court); Ken Strutin, Criminal Law Forensics: Century of
Acceptance May Be Over, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8, 2008, at 5 (“The gold standards of forensic
science are losing their luster.”).
4
Robert Garcia, “Garbage In, Gospel Out”: Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability,
and the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1073 (1991) (“Computerized information
may be wrong, incomplete, or misleading due to mechanical failure, mistake, fraud, or
bias. Ultimately, people are responsible for any errors, and there are infinite ways in
which people can make mistakes, commit fraud or reflect bias. Broad discovery may
be necessary to track down the reliability problems and evaluate the reliability of the
computerized information.”).
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necessary to use database knowledge comparable to the prosecution.
Much of this information is generated solely by the government or its
experts. The civilian alternatives are prohibitively expensive, inadequate,
or non-existent.5 This review will highlight the problems created by
disparities in resources and the role of constitutional and procedural
remedies in the future development of criminal electronic discovery.
[3] The discussion is divided into several areas, beginning with an
examination of the benefits of database discovery in criminal practice
under Part I. Part II is an analysis of the small body of criminal electronic
discovery cases involving databases and the rules that have been applied
over the years. Parts III and IV analyze the constitutional foundations for
defense access to government database tools under due process,
compulsory process and the right to confrontation. Applications of these
theories are illustrated through developments in DNA database discovery
in Part V, which highlights challenges to the quality of data and the right
to access DNA databanks for defense investigation. The issues that arise
in challenging evidence derived from databases, particularly data relied on
by experts, are discussed in Part VI. The ongoing problem of achieving
defense parity with prosecution resources and the constitutional grounds
for overcoming objections to disclosure or access to database information
is considered in Part VII. Finally, the conclusion, Part VIII, considers the
enormity of the task facing advocates as the criminal justice system, and
society at large, come to terms with this next wave in the Information
Revolution.
I. ELECTRONIC FOOTPRINTS
[4] A fact of modern life in the twenty-first century is the electronic
footprint. Our choices and movements leave digital traces—the results of
making life more convenient. These traces also impact the administration
of justice in unforeseen ways.
[5] Facing a murder charge in federal court arising from the shooting
death of a government witness in the Bronx, Jason Jones informed police

5

See, e.g., People v. Evans, 534 N.Y.S.2d 640, 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (providing an
example of why such alternatives are inadequate).
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that he was innocent.6 He claimed that at the time of the shooting he was
riding the bus from his job at a manufacturing plant in Yonkers to cash his
paycheck and then took the subway to visit his girlfriend.7 It was a classic
alibi defense, except for the witness, his MetroCard.8
[6] The card was still in his wallet when he was arrested.9 Once his
lawyer’s investigator made use of it, the foundations of his innocence
claim took shape.10 The New York City Transit authority provided a
report of Jones’s movements on the bus and subway, miles away from the
crime scene, based on the unique serial number from his MetroCard.11
Along with a punch card from his job and his image captured on a
surveillance camera when he went to cash his paycheck, the credibility of
Jones’s alibi defense supported reexamination of his bail status—
eventually leading the prosecutors to agree to his release upon posting
bond.12
[7] The city’s database of transit records, along with the other
documentation of Jones’s activities that night, gave the defense an
invaluable and nearly unimpeachable source of exculpatory evidence. It is
only one example of the power that databases can have in the prosecution
and defense of criminal cases.13
6

See Benjamin Weiser, Murder Suspect Has Witness that Doesn’t Lie: A MetroCard,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at A1.
7
Id.
8
The MetroCard is a payment system for travel on New York City buses and subways.
Each card has a magnetic strip that records the amount of money or time remaining on
the card. A centralized computer system stores data on where and when each card is used
based on information it retrieves from buses and subway turnstiles. Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See United States v. Jones, 583 F. Supp. 2d 513, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The
Government, after reviewing the Documentary Evidence, agreed to consent to a bail
package for Jason Jones, and Magistrate Judge Katz approved the bail conditions on
October 15, 2008.”).
13
See, e.g., Madison Park, E-ZPass Details Popping Up in Trials: Toll Records Leave
Trail for Officers, BALT. SUN, Aug. 31, 2007, at 1B:
E-Z Pass [sic] was first used in New York in 1993, and today there are
9 million users who rang up more than 2 billion transactions in 2006,
according to the E-ZPass Interagency Group, an Atlantic City, N.J.,
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[8] In Jones’s case the New York City Transit Authority complied with a
defense request to supply a travel log of his movements.14 As the
decisional law shows, however, requests for access to government, and
especially law enforcement databases, are often an uphill battle.
II. DATABASE DISCOVERY
[9] The constitutional underpinnings of criminal justice require the
prosecution to produce reliable and material evidence of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.15 The accused has the rights to confrontation, crossexamination, and compulsory process.16 Increasingly, both sides are
looking toward nonhuman sources of information in preparing their cases.
Databases in a raw sense are an extension of human memory and
computational ability. It is only natural that they have become powerful
and increasingly common witnesses in many prosecutions.
[10] Some of the largest government and private databases in the world
have information directly relevant to the administration of justice.
According to Business Intelligence Lowdown, Sprint, with over 53 million
subscribers, “processes more than 365 million call detail records and
operational measurements per day;” YouTube has more than 45 terabytes
[trillion bytes] of videos; ChoicePoint harvested 250 terabytes of personal
data on 250 million people; venerable AT&T has 323 terabytes of
information and 1.9 trillion phone call records; and the U.S. Customs
database contains “information on hundreds of thousands of people and
objects entering and leaving the United States borders.”17

organization comprising 23 agencies in the 12 states where the system
is in use.
Id.
Weiser, supra note 6.
15
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.”).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17
Mini Singh, Top 10 Largest Databases in the World, BUS. INTELLIGENCE LOWDOWN,
Feb. 15, 2007,
14
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[11] Law enforcement databases go even further. There are forensic
databanks of identifying information such as fingerprints, DNA and
ballistics,18 and more data collected by the IRS, SEC, DEA and other
agencies.19 An example of the direction in which these databanks are
moving is the resource created to assist law enforcement in locating

http://www.businessintelligencelowdown.com/2007/02/top_10_largest_.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009).
18
See, e.g., Robin Bowen & Jessica Schneider, Forensic Databases: Paint, Shoe Prints,
and Beyond, 258 NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Oct. 2007, at 34, 38, available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/219603h.pdf (summarizing a study conducted by West
Virginia University surveying government and private forensic databases used in law
enforcement). It is important to observe their qualification of this research: “[t]he
National Institute of Justice has not evaluated the utility, accuracy, or veracity of the data
in these databases; no product approval or endorsement by the U.S. Department of Justice
should be inferred.” Id. at 38.
19
See Garcia, supra note 4, at 1065.
The government hopes to combine sophisticated information retrieval
and expert systems with electronic databases, spy satellites and other
technological marvels to fight drug trafficking, money laundering, tax
evasion, and other crimes. The government has established a
computerized financial crimes and money laundering control center
that will integrate the databases of more than half a dozen federal and
state agencies, including Customs, the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA), the IRS, the Federal Reserve, and the State Department. The
Counter Narcotics Center based at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
headquarters, created in 1989, includes agents from the FBI, the DEA,
the NSA, the Defense Department, the State Department, and the Coast
Guard.
Id.; see also National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), http://www.niem.gov/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009).
NIEM, the National Information Exchange Model, is a partnership of
the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security. It is designed to develop, disseminate and support enterprisewide information exchange standards and processes that can enable
jurisdictions to effectively share critical information in emergency
situations, as well as support the day-to-day operations of agencies
throughout the nation.
Id.
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cannabis cultivation by using geographic data systems and knowledge
bases.20
[12] Computers in the 1960s had barely moved from vacuum tubes to
solid-state circuitry when the first criminal prosecutions relying on this
technology were brought.21 Still, these machines were powerful enough to
serve federal prosecutors at this early stage of modern computing and
addressed discovery issues that remain unresolved.22
[13] In 1967, the defendants in United States v. Dioguardi23 had been
accused of fraudulently transferring and concealing property of a
bankruptcy.24 This case relied heavily on an analysis of sales figures,
purchase orders, assets and inventories.25 Government witnesses used a
computer program to collect the data and compute their findings to
support their theory of the case.26 Although the U.S. attorney provided
the defense with printouts of their calculations, the defense objected and
asked for the actual program.27 Despite arguments that the information
constituted Jencks Act material28 and the printouts were hearsay, the court
denied the defense discovery motion.29
20

See, e.g., Finding the Marijuana Fields: A Computer Points the Finger, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1987, at A33
(discussing the early work of scientists at the United States Geological Survey and in the
private sector who have developed a computer mapping program that uses data on “land
ownership, distance from towns, transportation routes, water sources, natural vegetation,
elevation, sunshine angle and slope of the land”). Information from this database would
figure prominently in probable cause and suppression matters. See id.
21
See generally Carol Iaciofano, Computer Timeline, in DIGITAL DELI 20, 26-27 (Steve
Ditlea ed., 1984) (noting the prosecution of the first computer crime in 1964, and the first
federal case in 1966).
22
See, e.g., United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1970).
23
428 F. 2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1970).
24
Id. at 1034.
25
Id. at 1037.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2006):
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the
United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the
witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the
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[14] On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
observed that there was a fundamental right to discovery underlying the
defense request:
We fully agree that the defendants were entitled to know
what operations the computer had been instructed to
perform and to have the precise instruction that had been
given. It is quite incomprehensible that the prosecution
should tender a witness to state the results of a computer’s
operations without having the program available for
defense scrutiny and use on cross-examination if desired.
We place the Government on the clearest possible notice of
its obligation to do this and also of the great desirability of
making the program and other materials needed for crossexamination of computer witnesses, such as flow-charts
used in the preparation of programs, available to the
defense a reasonable time before trial.30
[15] Nonetheless, the court affirmed the conviction.31 Defense counsel
failed to raise their32 best grounds for relief until their reply brief on
subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire
contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the
testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly
to the defendant for his examination and use.
Id.; see also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957):
[T]he criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the
ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for
the accused’s inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant
statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses
touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial. The burden is
the Government’s, not to be shifted to the trial judge, to decide whether
the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is greater
than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of state secrets and
other confidential information in the Government’s possession.
Id. (citation omitted).
29
Dioguardi, 428 F.2d at 1038.
30
Id. at 1038.
31
Id. at 1040.
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appeal, i.e., testing the validity of the program and preparing for crossexamination of the witness.33 In other words, they did not preserve the
issue in the district court by specifying the grounds for their motion—
instead they focused too much on their Jencks argument. Also, they were
not prejudiced by the trial judge’s decision to deny access. This was a
case of punch cards versus adding machines. The calculations were
simple, the data set limited and the computer’s operations verifiable by
tabulators or manually during the course of the trial or pending appeal. At
the same time, defense counsel did not renew or clarify their motion or
seek a subpoena for the information during the trial.34
[16] Forty years later, the data relied on in criminal prosecutions and the
computing power needed to manage them can exceed a defendant’s ability
to realistically challenge the prosecution without adequate discovery.35
Even when discovery is provided, the volume and nature of the response
can be overwhelming and debilitating.36 Today, computer discovery
cannot be characterized as simple or limited. Data and documents are
being produced in soaring and unmanageable numbers.37 As a result, the
risk of prejudice to the defense has grown proportionately.38
[17] Confronted with a lengthy indictment charging securities fraud, the
defendants in United State v. Ferguson39 filed a bill of particulars seeking
specification of the false statements, false documents and fraudulent
scheme at the heart of the case. 40 In accordance with Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,41 the prosecutors turned over 3.5
32

Two individuals served as counsel for the defendant-appellants in this case. Id. at
1034.
33
Id. at 1038.
34
Id. at 1039.
35
See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 4, 6 (2007).
36
See id. ¶¶ 15-18 (providing an example of how discovery documents can become
voluminous and unmanageable).
37
See id. ¶¶ 9-10.
38
Id. ¶ 23.
39
478 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D. Conn. 2007).
40
Id. at 225.
41
18 U.S.C. Rule 16(a)(1)(E)-(F) (2006) (defining a defendant’s right to seek access to or
a copy of “books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or
places” and “results or reports of any physical or mental examination and of any
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million pages of discovery “in the exact same electronically searchable
format that the government is currently using.”42 When the defendants
were arraigned, they received 1,350 pages of “hot documents,”
representing the most important information relevant to the allegations.43
[18] As in Dioguardi, prejudice was not found.44 The government’s
response was sufficient to overcome the need to speculate about which
materials might be relevant from millions of documents or unspecified
allegations.45 While denying the defendant’s request for a bill of
particulars, the court identified three important disclosure requirements:
(1) a detailed accusatory instrument; (2) a full Rule 16 disclosure in an
organized format, such as a searchable database; and (3) a list or
identification of the “most relevant” documents.46 These guidelines are a
good starting point for measuring the responsiveness of the prosecution’s
discovery obligations. The next step involves search methodology.
[19] When an employee in the Department of State in Canada was
indicted for allegedly accepting gifts in exchange for expediting visa
applications from a business owner, STS Jewels, for his workers, a federal
judge in the District of Columbia ordered the government to search its
print and electronic files for responsive information.47 The discovery
order covered information about visa applications, requests for expedited
interviews, and decisions.48 The files were located in six different
consulates in Canada and Mexico.49
[20] The scope of the search was justified by the defense’s theory that
STS applications were similar to other routine expedited requests granted
scientific test or experiment,” among other things, that the government possesses,
provided it meets the other statutory criteria).
42
Ferguson, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 227; see United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1970).
45
See Ferguson, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
46
Id. (“Given the degree of detail in the indictment and the government’s provision of
searchable discovery databases and a list of its key documents, the defendants have not
proven that they require more particularization to adequately prepare their defenses,
avoid prejudicial surprise at trial, and protect against future double jeopardy.”).
47
See United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 15-16, 24 (D.D.C. 2008).
48
Id. at 16.
49
Id.
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without any incentives.50
The defendants’ request specified the
methodology: “[F]or each location searched, defendants demand a
comprehensive description of all of the sources that were searched (both
paper and electronic), how each source was searched, and who conducted
the search.”51 The search was designed to be thorough, beginning in
electronic sources and extending back to archival print files.52 It included
“active servers” and “backup tapes,” the parameters extended to “all
email” and “stand-alone electronic documents” stored on “shared drives,
personal drives and hard drives,” and the search terms were “early or
expedite* or appointment or early & interview or expedite* &
interview.”53
[21] The defendants objected to information produced in paper or
electronically that did not identify the source or records keeper.54 They
requested that the government create an index for the hard copy
documents indicating the custodian, job title, source, format (paper or
electronic), and Bates number.55 There was a gray area between print and
computer files that made it impossible for the defense to make full use of
the discovery or determine its completeness.56
[22] Without guidance from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
judge looked to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for help.57
50

Id.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 17-18.
54
Id. at 18.
55
Id. Bates numbering, or Bates stamping, is used to place identifying numbers and/or
date/time-marks on images and documents as they are scanned or processed (for
example, during the discovery stage of preparations for trial). Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 161 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a Bates number as, “[t]he identifying number
that is affixed to a document or to the individual pages of a document.”).
56
See O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 16-18.
57
See id. at 18-19:
51

In criminal cases, there is unfortunately no rule to which the courts can
look for guidance in determining whether the production of documents
by the government has been in a form or format that is appropriate.
This may be because the “big paper” case is the exception rather than
the rule in criminal cases.
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In civil cases, Rule 34 has been applied over the years to carve out
methods for the form and format of documents in high volume paper (and
now electronic) cases.58 It begins by requiring the producing party to turn
over the records in the same manner as they were kept or categorized
according to the discovery request:
(E) Producing the Documents or Electronically
Stored Information. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered
by the court, these procedures apply to producing
documents or electronically stored information:
(i) A party must produce documents as they
are kept in the usual course of business or must
organize and label them to correspond to the
categories in the request 59
[23] The judge recognized that the Rule’s purpose was to maintain
“equality between the parties in their ability to search the documents.”60
To be usable, the files produced had to be searchable.61 Moreover, their
value as evidence depended on the defendants’ ability to authenticate
them.62 Without knowing the author, custodian and source of the
Id.; In re Lees, 727 N.Y.S.2d 254, 254-57 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (stating defendant made
an ex parte discovery request in rape case for access to complainant’s and third party’s
computer for impeachment evidence granted under N.Y. Civil Practice Laws and Rules
because no remedy existed under the Criminal Procedure law).
58
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19:
It is foolish to disregard them [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]
merely because this is a criminal case, particularly where, as is the case
here, it is far better to use these rules than to reinvent the wheel when
the production of documents in criminal and civil cases raises the same
problems.
Id.; see Floyd v. New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68798, at *1-2, *56, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008) (stating that plaintiffs in class action suit against NYPD
over an allegedly race-based stop and frisk policy sought court ordered disclosure of
records in the police database under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
59
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i).
60
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19.
61
See id. at 20.
62
Id.
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documents, electronic or paper, the defense could not meet the
authentication requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 901.63 The
magistrate judge took the step of recommending to the district court judge
that all documents supplied by the government in response to the
discovery request should be treated as authentic, avoiding the burdensome
task of having the government certify everything under Rule 902(11).64
[24] The defense also challenged the thoroughness of the government’s
search methods in the following ways: “1) not interviewing the employees
as to their use of electronic means as a form of communication regarding
expedited reviews, 2) not having the employees search their own
electronically stored information and 3) not indicating what software [the
government] used to conduct the search or how it ascertained what search
terms it would use.”65 The alleged failure of the prosecution to use
forensic indexing tools, commonly relied on by law enforcement, could
have hampered the completeness and accuracy of the search 66 by, for
example, overlooking email stored in .pst files.67
63

FED. R. EVID. 901 (“The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.”). The Notes of the Advisory Committee
on Rules raised the problem peculiar to criminal cases, which did not have pretrial
procedures for resolving this issue. “Today, such available procedures as requests to
admit and pretrial conference afford the means of eliminating much of the need for
authentication or identification. Also, significant inroads upon the traditional insistence
on authentication and identification have been made by accepting as at least prima facie
genuine items of the kind treated in Rule 902, infra. However, the need for suitable
methods of proof still remains, since criminal cases pose their own obstacles to the use of
preliminary procedures, unforeseen contingencies may arise, and cases of genuine
controversy will still occur.”). FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note.
64
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
65
Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
66
See, e.g., Amy Baron-Evans, When the Government Seizes and Searches Your Client’s
Computer, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 19-20, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ElecDi17.pdf/$file/ElecDi17.pdf (discussing
the use of forensic software by law enforcement for searching computers).
67
See generally About.com, PST (Personal Folders File),
http://email.about.com/od/outlook/g/pst.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (defining .pst,
which stands for Personal Storage Table, as a filename extension associated with
Personal Folders files used with certain Microsoft products to store data locally).
Personal Folders (.pst) files are used to store local copies of messages, calendar events,
and other items within Microsoft, Microsoft Exchange Client, Windows Messaging,
Microsoft Outlook, and Microsoft Outlook Express. Id.
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[25] Lack of preservation or spoliation of evidence68 might have been a
legitimate concern, but no specific claims were made that would have
borne out a due process violation.69 Metadata70 concerns, however, were
also raised.71 The files produced were in PDF72 or TIFF73 image formats,
which can obscure hidden file information.74 Only the native files
contained the full metadata.75 Rule 34 speaks to the method used by the
producing party to normally store the files.76 Since the request did not
identify a particular format, the response was within the Rules:
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for
producing electronically stored information, a party must
produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily
maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and
68

See United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (defining spoliation
as “the intentional destruction of evidence that is presumed to be unfavorable to the party
responsible for its destruction” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (8th ed. 2004)));
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (implying that the
“failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably
foreseeable litigation” is inherent in the definition of spoliation (quoting West v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999))).
69
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 22-23.
70
Metadata is “information about a particular data set or document which describes how,
when, and by whom the dataset or document was collected, created, accessed, or
modified; its size; and how it is formatted. Some metadata, such as file dates and sizes,
can easily be seen by users; other metadata can be hidden from users but are still
available to the operating system or the program used to process the data set or
document.” Barbara J. Rothstein et al., Managing Discovery of Electronic Information:
A Pocket Guide for Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 24-25 (2007), available at
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf. See generally
SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES &
COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 2829, 35 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining what metadata is, what it does, and how it may be
useful).
71
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
72
Portable Document Format (PDF) is a file format created by Adobe Systems for
document exchange, and it is used for representing two-dimensional documents in a
manner independent of the application software, hardware, and operating system.
Rothstein, supra note 70, at 25.
73
Tagged Image File Format (abbreviated TIFF) is a file format for storing images,
including photographs. Rothstein, supra note 70, at 13.
74
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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(iii) A party need not produce the same
electronically stored information in more than one form.77
[26] The sufficiency of the government’s response hinged on whether the
files in an image format were “reasonably usable.”78 The magistrate judge
admonished defendants to get a stipulation requiring the prosecution to
preserve the files in their native format, and if the prosecution failed to
agree, the magistrate judge suggested that the defendants seek a court
order.79
[27] Lastly, the defendants criticized the search terms used to unearth the
files.80 The magistrate judge considered this issue of such complexity that
he suggested a defense challenge to their sufficiency must satisfy the
elements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.81
[28] The use of proper search terms is probably one of the most difficult
issues to litigate and solve. Searchers must have insight into the language
and terms of art, as well as the factual background of the case, to even
begin formulating the correct queries. Making a discovery request that
captures the proper search terminology would be impossible without
knowing the choice of vocabulary and syntax used by the government (or
the creators of the documents or data). This may be an appropriate
situation for seeking the input and assistance of a defense expert in

77

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii)-(iii).
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
79
Id. at 23.
80
Id. at 23-24.
81
Id. at 24; see FED. R. EVID. 702:
78

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
Id.
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database searching.82 As discussed in Part III, the defense should not have
to rely on the prosecution’s skill in ferreting out exculpatory or mitigating
information from a government resource. No one but the defense can
view evidence with an “advocate’s eye.”83
[29] In a money laundering case, an IRS agent testifying for the
government prepared summaries and exhibits illustrating the contents of
bank records.84 The prosecution used a computer program to run searches
laying the foundation for the spreadsheets and other exhibits they planned
to use.85 The defendants sought discovery of the financial database to
assess the “accuracy, completeness, and fairness” of the exhibits and
evidence.86
[30] Denying the motion, the district court concluded that the “source
material” or “underlying data” were the actual bank records—available for
examination for three years.87 Giving the defense access to the
prosecution database would reveal the search queries run by the agent,
which the judge characterized as work product.88 The court added that the
defense was “equally as capable” as the agent of examining the bank
records to determine if the summaries were accurate89—and of course,
they would have an opportunity for cross-examination.90
82

An expert in text searching (or a subject expert) can be drawn from any of several
disciplines, such as information and computer science or linguistics. See, e.g., Peter
Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, The Linguist on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguistics
in American Courts, 78 LANGUAGE 221, 221 (2002), available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/language/v078/78.2solan.pdf (discussing the applications of
linguistic expertise in civil and criminal cases and the courts’ views on admissibility).
83
Cf. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (stating while the defendant may
be denied the benefits of an “advocate’s eye,” partial disclosure is sufficient).
84
United States v. Schmidt, No. 04-cr-00103-REB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30559, *1-2
(D. Colo. Apr. 25, 2007).
85
Id. at *2.
86
Id.
87
Id. at *3.
88
Id.
89
Id. at *4. But see Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004 WL 1535854, at *1,
*4-*5 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2004) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action over custodial
arrests for nonviolent ordinance violations, where the court granted the city’s motion for
disclosure of the plaintiffs database drawn from municipal arrest records: “Because the
court finds that the City has a substantial need for access to the database and that the City
could not obtain the substantial equivalent of the database without the undue hardship of
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[31] The defense made a due process argument that the court rejected.91
Still, in a case with voluminous records and a database created by the
prosecution using undisclosed search terms, it would be extremely
difficult to find the very same documents that the government relied on.92
Because unearthing relevant, discoverable information in large databases
can be problematic, partial or unguided disclosure is of little value. And,
while an incomplete database may be useful,93 it is not a substitute for full
discovery.
[32] Uncontrolled searches of massive databases are like a right without a
remedy. Burying the defense in data (as opposed to paper) does not serve
the ends of justice and wastes resources. Full discovery must comport
with due process and fulfill the constitutional mandates of compulsory
expending extensive, duplicative resources, the court compels production of the
database.”). The contents, a database of 20,000 arrest records, did not reveal mental
impressions or litigation strategy and constituted fact, not opinion, work product. Id. at
*3.
90
Schmidt, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30559, at *4; cf. Jules Epstein, The Great Engine that
Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36
STETSON L. REV. 727, 729 (2007) (examining how exonerations and scientific studies
have uncovered the shortcomings of cross-examination as a tool for ferreting out the truth
of eyewitness identification, an issue that goes to the “integrity of the adversarial
process”).
91
Schmidt, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30559, at *3.
92
Cf. Tessera, Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. C06-80024MISC-JW(PVT), 2006 WL
733498, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006) (“Accordingly non-party Hynix Semiconductor
America shall produce on DVD-ROMS or hard drives documents derived using specific
search terms from databases created for the U.S. Department of Justice investigation of
the DRAM industry and any related preceding litigation in which the Hynix
Semiconductor companies were a party.”) (emphasis added).
93
See Omax Corp. v. Flow Int’l Corp., No. C04-2334L, 2007 WL 1830631, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. June 22, 2007). The district court ordered disclosure of an incomplete database:
Though Flow may very well be correct that the “Project” database is
incomplete and potentially unhelpful in explaining differences between
initial price quotations and final sales prices, Omax is nevertheless still
entitled to the information contained in the ‘Project’ database, at least
as it relates to initial price quotations offered to customers and potential
customers. Though the data may be of limited value, it does have some
value and it is relevant to Omax’s damages case.
Id.
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process and confrontation. Without substantial guidelines on prosecutorial
disclosure and expert assistance for the defense when needed, the ends of
justice are not furthered.
III. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE AND EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
[33] Private database services can be expensive, and much of the
government’s resources are not publicly accessible. Still, due process,
equal protection and the right to effective assistance of counsel require the
state to provide funds for expert and investigative services for those
without means, independent of their ability to afford counsel.94 Moreover,
regardless of cost, an accused ought to have access to relevant and
necessary resources in the exclusive possession or control of the state in
furthering confrontation and compulsory process rights.
[34] In People v. Evans,95 Stanley Evans faced charges of arson for
allegedly setting fire to two Chevrolet vans.96 In preparation for a hearing
seeking dismissal of the charges (or in the alternative, trial), Evans asked
the judge to order the New York City Police Department’s Auto Crime
Division to provide an expert who could examine the nonpublic VINS.97
94

See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985).
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that
his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at
trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a
psychiatrist’s assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise
afford one.

Id. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in
a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1331-38 (2004)
(discussing availability of expert witnesses to indigent criminal defendants); Edward C.
Monahan & James J. Clark, Funds For Resources For Indigent Defendants Represented
By Retained Counsel, Champion, Dec. 1996, at 16, 18 ("Clients are seldom going to risk
trial with retained counsel if that means they must forfeit access to funds for experts,
investigation and other services despite their real indigence.").
95
534 N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
96
Id. at 641.
97
Id. The vehicle identification number (VIN) refers to:
The identifying code for [a] SPECIFIC automobile. It is [a] car’s
fingerprint. It sets . . . vehicles apart from the millions of vehicles out
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His goal was to dispute ownership of the vehicles and uncover
irregularities in the numbers.98 The motion, brought ex parte, was
granted.99
[35] The Police Department asked the court to vacate the order.100 Citing
the state’s obligation under Ake to provide expert services to indigent
defendants and the accused’s right to compulsory process, the judge
concluded:
Where the government holds a monopoly of expertise on a
matter that reasonably bears on a defense in a criminal
action, due process requires that a defendant be afforded
access to this expertise. Such a rule places the defendant in
the same position as the prosecutor because the district
attorney unquestionably has the right to compel the police
department auto crime experts to cooperate with the People
in an appropriate case.101
[36] The only public source of the expertise was the NYPD’s Auto Crime
Division.102 Private sources like the National Auto Theft Bureau and
General Motors would not accede to Evans’ request.103 In addition, the
judge observed that the ability of the defendant in this situation to hire an
expert was irrelevant because “[w]hether or not he has funds to hire an
expert, if the only source of expertise that may reasonably be necessary to

there. Recently the VIN is reflected by 17 digit characters. It displays
a car’s uniqueness and manufacturer and provides a method to trace [a]
car from the factory to the junk yard. [A] VIN can be used to track
recalls, registrations, warranty claims, thefts and insurance coverage.
Vehicle Identification Number – VIN Numbers, What is a Vehicle Identification Number
(VIN)?,
http://www.vehicleidentificationnumber.com/vehicle_identification_numbers_vin_info.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
98
See Evans, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 641-42.
101
Id. at 642 (internal footnote omitted).
102
Id. at 641.
103
Id. at 643.
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his defense resides with the government, the government must give him
access. This is the essence of fairness. Due process mandates no less.”104
IV. BRADY
[37] Evans began with a pre-trial request for expert assistance.105 Under
Brady v. Maryland,106 the prosecution may have an affirmative obligation
to utilize or reveal computer-based information or face severe sanctions
for nondisclosure and lack of cooperation.107 The judge in Evans
considered the potential problem of relying on the prosecution to conduct
such investigations, and rejected the notion that the defense was “required
to rest solely on the thoroughness and promptitude of the prosecutor.”108
104

Id.
Id. at 641.
106
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
107
Id. at 87; see also United States v. Dollar, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1322 (N.D. Ala. 1998)
(“All charges against both defendants will be dismissed with prejudice because the
United States . . . flagrantly, breached its unquestioned obligation to produce exculpatory
and impeachment materials imposed by Brady v. Maryland.”) (citation omitted); cf.
Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 255 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating dismissal with
prejudice is not always an appropriate remedy for government failure to turnover results
of an ATF database search without finding exceptional circumstances: “While retrial is
normally the most severe sanction available for a Brady violation, where a defendant can
show both willful misconduct by the government, and prejudice, dismissal may be
proper.” (footnote omitted)).
108
Evans, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 642 n.2. Compare United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14,
29-30 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[O]pen-file discovery does not relieve the government of its
Brady obligations. The government cannot meet its Brady obligations by providing Ms.
Hsia with access to 600,000 documents and then claiming that she should have been able
to find the exculpatory information in the haystack. To the extent that the government
knows of any documents or statements that constitute Brady material, it must identify that
material to Ms. Hsia.”), with United States v. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080 (D.
Mont. 2005):
105

As it relates to the manner of production, Brady simply requires that
information be produced in such a way that it will be of value to the
accused. The government’s production in this case complies with that
requirement for at least two reasons. First, the documents have been
presented in a searchable format. More importantly, over half of the
documents presented -- 2,613,658 pages -- are actually Grace
documents provided to the government during the Libby Superfund
Clean-up litigation. There is no reason to assume that the government
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The Supreme Court’s holding in Kyles v. Whitley,109 underscores this
point. 110
[38] Curtis Lee Kyles was sentenced to death for the murder of a 60-yearold woman in a supermarket parking lot.111 His case rested largely on the
testimony of an informant, who gave several inconsistent statements, and
whose accounts raised suspicions about his involvement—all leading to
serious potential challenges to eyewitness descriptions introduced at
trial.112
[39] One element of the prosecution’s theory was that Kyles drove his car
to the parking lot where the murder was committed—leaving it there as he
drove away in the victim’s vehicle.113 That night when the police arrived
at the scene, they took down the license numbers of all the cars parked
there, assuming one of the cars belonged to Kyles.114 A computer printout
of license plate numbers did not include Kyles’ car, but authorities failed
to disclose this fact to the defense.115 At a minimum, disclosing this fact
would have given Kyles’ attorney a basis to challenge a grainy photo
supposedly showing the defendant’s car and contradict statements by the
police informant who claimed to have picked up Kyles’ vehicle later on
from that location.116

is better equipped through resources or knowledge to locate
exculpatory documents than are the Defendants.
Id. (footnote omitted).
514 U.S. 419 (1995).
110
See id. at 453 (“[T]he question is not whether the State would have had a case to go to
the jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that
the jury’s verdict would have been the same.”).
111
Id. at 419, 423.
112
See id. at 450, 453.
113
Id. at 423.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 428-29.
116
Id. at 450.
109
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V. DNA DATABASES AND THIRD PARTY SUSPECTS117
[40] The Court in Kyles hinted at the value of exculpatory evidence that
pointed the “arrow of inculpation”118 in another direction.119 The
revelations in that case did more to indict the informant than the
defendant. Third party exculpatory information has gained importance
and acceptance with the advent of DNA profiling.120 Since the U.S.
government maintains the largest DNA databank in the world as part of its
law enforcement operations,121 it makes sense that it could also be used in
preparation of a defense based on an alternate suspect.
[41] There are only a handful of other countries with comparable
resources, and none as extensive as the FBI database.122 The enormity of
117

There are a host of issues related to DNA discovery, access to post-conviction testing,
and actual innocence claims that will not be considered in this article. See generally
Glenn A. Garber & Angharad Vaughan, Actual-Innocence Policy, Non-DNA Innocence
Claims, 239 N.Y.L.J. 4 (2008) (stating that courts should review claims of innocence in
non-DNA cases); Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629
(2008) (arguing that appeals and post-conviction proceedings should review claims of
innocence based on the “probative value of new evidence of innocence”).
118
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 46 (1987) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ritchie,
502 A.2d 148, 153 (Pa. 1985)).
119
See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 450.
120
See Steven Wisotsky, Miscarriages of Justice: Their Causes and Cures, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 547, 548 (2007).
121
“The CODIS Unit manages the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and the
National DNA Index System (NDIS) and is responsible for developing, providing, and
supporting the CODIS Program to federal, state, and local crime laboratories in the
United States and selected international law enforcement crime laboratories to foster the
exchange and comparison of forensic DNA evidence from violent crime investigations.
The CODIS Unit also provides administrative management and support to the FBI for
various advisory boards, Department of Justice (DOJ) grant programs, and legislation
regarding DNA.” Federal Bureau of Investigation: CODIS,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/html/codis1.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
122
The National DNA Index (NDIS) “contains over 6,539,919 offender profiles and
248,943 forensic profiles as of December 2008. Ultimately, the success of the CODIS
program will be measured by the crimes it helps to solve. CODIS’s primary metric, the
‘Investigation Aided,’ tracks the number of criminal investigations where CODIS has
added value to the investigative process. As of December 2008, CODIS has produced
over 80,900 hits assisting in more than 80,900 investigations.” Federal Bureau of
Investigation: CODIS-NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009). But see The National DNA Database, available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov/uk/science-research/using-science/dna-database/ (last visited
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this unparalleled resource is beyond the capacity of under-resourced
defendants.123 The technology has advanced and improved over time,
laying the groundwork for more post-conviction motions for testing or
retesting biological evidence. This becomes all the more important as the
scope of databanks changes.124

Feb. 10, 2009) (showing that the United Kingdom National DNA Database is second
largest database with 4,983,859 profiles); 479 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2008) 2344W,
available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080929/text/80929w0
011.htm.
123
See, e.g., Brian Bakst, Public Defenders Feel the Strain from Complex Courtroom
Science, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., Feb. 27, 2005:
While the use of DNA evidence has grown rapidly in recent years,
public defenders’ expertise in the science has not. That’s why the
Board of Public Defense is seeking $1 million for a team of specially
trained attorneys, ready for dispatch around Minnesota on major cases
that hinge on DNA evidence or chemical tests on controlled substances
like methamphetamine.
Id.
124

Recently, the Department of Justice promulgated a rule expanding its DNA collection
efforts to encompass arrestees. See DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence
Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 238 (Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (“This rule generally directs federal agencies to collect DNA samples
from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from non-United
States persons who are detained under the authority of the United States, subject to
certain limitations and exceptions.”); Spencer S. Hsu, New Rule Expands DNA Collection
to All People Arrested, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2008, at A2 (“The change could add as
many as 1.2 million people a year to the national database, U.S. officials said.”).
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has been ordered to change its retention rules to exclude
DNA belonging to “unconvicted persons.” See In re S. & Marper v. United Kingdom,
App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (stating that permanent retention of
DNA from innocent persons violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private . . . life . . .”); Richard Ford,
Police Are Ordered to Destroy All DNA Samples Taken from Innocent People, TIMES
(London), Dec. 5, 2008, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5289312.ece (“More than 1.6
million DNA and fingerprint samples of innocent people on police databases must be
destroyed after a court ruled yesterday that keeping them breaches human rights.”).
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[42] In the 2008 term,125 the United States Supreme Court will hear the
case of William Osborne, convicted of kidnapping and assault in 1994,
and sentenced to 26 years in prison.126 He has been seeking access to
genetic material for retesting in the Alaska state courts.127 His aim is to
apply modern techniques, unavailable at the time of his original trial, to
the samples.128 Although many states have enacted laws permitting postconviction DNA testing, the Court must resolve whether there is a federal
constitutional right to such testing.129 Moreover, the questions of whether
a defendant would have the right to access the database to test existing
genetic material or seek a sample from a third party for testing has yet to
be resolved.130 This right would have its basis in the compulsory process
clause, under the rubric of the right to present a defense.131
[43] In Holmes v. South Carolina,132 the Supreme Court struck down a
state court precedent that would have blocked evidence of third party guilt
based on the strength of the prosecution’s case.133 Holmes was on trial for
murder and proffered testimony of witnesses who put another suspect in
the victim’s neighborhood at the time of event.134 These witnesses would
have testified that this alternate suspect either confessed or admitted that
Holmes was innocent.135 However, the United States Supreme Court
noted that South Carolina Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Gregory,136
deprived Holmes of the ability to present a complete defense:
125

October Term 2008 runs from Oct. 6, 2008 through Sept. 5, 2009. 2008 Term
Opinions of the Court, Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08slipopinion.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
126
Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v.
Osborne, 521 F.3 1118 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2008)
(No. 08-6).
127
Id.
128
See David Stout, Supreme Court to Review DNA Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008.
129
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 126, at (i).
130
See generally Ken Strutin, Third Party Culpability DNA Evidence, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 4,
2005, at 4 (explaining the efficacy of retesting DNA evidence will depend upon a
reexamination of longstanding discovery, testing and admissibility rules).
131
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
132
547 U.S. 319 (2006).
133
Id. at 331.
134
Id. at 323.
135
Id.
136
16 S.E.2d 532 (1941).
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[B]y evaluating the strength of only one party’s evidence,
no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength
of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or
cast doubt. Because the rule applied by the State Supreme
Court in this case did not heed this point, the rule is
“arbitrary” in the sense that it does not rationally serve the
end that the Gregory rule and other similar third-party guilt
rules were designed to further. Nor has the State identified
any other legitimate end that the rule serves. It follows that
the rule applied in this case by the State Supreme Court
violates a criminal defendant’s right to have “‘a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.’”137
[44] Shortly after Holmes was decided, the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals heard the arguments of Sedley Alley,138 a man sentenced to death
for murder, kidnapping and rape, 139 who sought access to DNA testing to
show that someone else was responsible.140 The Sixth Circuit had already
denied his § 1983141 motion for testing, finding no constitutional right of

137

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331; see Gregory, 16 S.E.2d at 543.
Alley v. State, No. W2006-01179-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 WL 1703820, *1 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2006).
139
His appeals were ultimately unsuccessful and he was executed shortly after this
decision. Melissa McNamara, Tenn. Executes 2nd Person in 45 Years, CBS NEWS, June
28, 2006, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/national/main1758849.shtml.
140
Id.
141
42 U.S.C. § 1983:
138

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Id.
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post-conviction access to DNA evidence.142 Finally, the Governor of
Tennessee granted a reprieve, allowing Alley to make a motion in state
court for DNA testing.143
[45] Alley asked that underwear found near the victim, a stick used in the
attack, and samples of genetic material from under the victim’s
fingernails, as well as about a dozen other items be tested.144 He believed
that “redundant results”145 would exculpate him. And at the same time, he
claimed that “DNA testing results could be entered into CODIS or a state
DNA database and score a ‘hit’ to a convicted offender, thus not only
exonerating Mr. Alley, but also identifying the actual assailant.”146 The
“assailant” might have been someone in CODIS, or a new suspect.147 As
discussed in the section below on reciprocal evidence, it appears that there
is a constitutional argument supporting a balance of access rights.
[46] Despite Alley’s reliance on Holmes, the state court denied his claim
as insufficient under Tennessee’s Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act.148
It found that Act to be limited to comparing a defendant’s DNA to crime
related evidence.149 The court rejected: “any implied testing of third party
individuals or the need to ‘run’ DNA testing results through a DNA
database for ‘hits.’ Indeed, other states have rejected requests to compare
DNA profiles with state and national DNA databases as ‘add[ing] yet
another layer of speculation.’”150 Rejecting the idea that the statute
created a liberty interest, the court did concede: “Any interest created by
enactment of the Act created a limited interest of a defendant in
142

McNamara, supra note 139.
Alley, 2006 WL 1703820, at *1.
144
Id. at *3.
145
Id. Redundant results are: “DNA tests results that establish the same genetic profile
on a number of probative items of evidence.” Id.
146
Id.
147
When a defendant claiming innocence seeks the genetic identity of an alternate
suspect through discovery, in essence, it is no different than when a prosecutor files a
John Doe DNA warrant to secure an indictment based on genetic material alone. See
Veronica Valdivieso, DNA Warrants: A Panacea for Old, Cold Rape Cases, 90 GEO. L.J.
1009, 1009 (2002).
148
Alley, 2006 WL 1703820, at *16.
149
See id. at *5.
150
Id. at *9 (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d 582, 586 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2005)).
143
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establishing his/her innocence and did not create an interest in establishing
the guilt of a speculative and unknown third party.”151 The court would
not accept an expansion of testing beyond confirming or negating Alley as
the source of the DNA.152
[47] The arguments made by Alley, including one grounded on actual
innocence,153 might be redeemed depending on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Osborne this term. Already, several Circuit Courts of Appeals
have recognized a federal constitutional right to post-conviction DNA
testing broader than most state statutes.154 The next step will be to justify
expanding that right to encompass investigation of third party or alternate
suspects.
[48] The federal and state DNA databases can serve two ends. Discovery,
on the one hand, is imperative to enable defendants to successfully raise
151

Id.
Id. at *24.
153
Id. at *10 (holding that there was no authority to consider a Herrera innocence claim
based on evidence outside the trial record). At best the state DNA statute provided a
gateway motion for potential future innocence claims. See generally Garrett, supra note
117 (discussing the case of House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) and subsequent claims of
innocence based on DNA); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
55 (2008) (examining the types of evidence that lead to wrongful convictions and later
exonerations through DNA).
154
See generally David A. Schumacher, Comment, Post-Conviction Access to DNA
Testing: The Federal Government Does Not Offer an Adequate Solution, Leaving the
States to Remedy the Situation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1245, 1246-47 (2008):
152

The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether post-conviction claims
are cognizable under § 1983, and the federal circuit courts of appeals
are split on the matter. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeals have all held that an inmate seeking to challenge a conviction
through DNA evidence does not have a cognizable claim because a §
1983 lawsuit amounts to a direct attack on the legitimacy of the
conviction. [¶] Four other circuits have gone the opposite way. The
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, as
well as district courts residing in two circuits that have yet to speak on
this issue, have held that while an inmate has a cognizable claim for
access to DNA testing under § 1983, the process for release must still
be found in a subsequent habeas corpus lawsuit.
Id.
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claims of third party responsibility and exonerate themselves. On the
other hand, access is necessary to challenge the validity of database output
used as prosecution evidence. There has been litigation to gain access to
the FBI database to test its accuracy and the validity of the statistical
conclusions underlying its matches.155
There is also the capital
prosecution case of Juan Luna, who was accused of participating in a
multiple homicide at a Chicago eatery.156
[49] A Cook County judge granted a discovery request (subpoena) from
Luna and ordered the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center to give
the defense limited access to the DNA profile database.157 “Luna’s
defense team [was] hoping the DNA database information [could] help
them poke holes in prosecutors’ assertions that DNA matching Luna with
a chicken dinner at the crime scene [had a] more than a 1 in 1 trillion
chance of being someone other than Luna.”158
[50] The prosecutors claimed that Luna’s DNA matched genetic material
taken from a chicken bone found at the crime scene, because Luna’s DNA
matched nine out of thirteen genetic loci,159 a match whose occurrence in
155

See, e.g., Jennifer Friedman, Release State DNA Profiles, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2008,
at 2 (referring to a letter to the Editor from a Los Angeles County Public Defender
pointing out the need for academics to vet the state databank to assess the accuracy of
statistical profiling).
156
See Now, Another Kind of Waiting Begins, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Jan. 8, 2003, at 1
(reporting on a five part series about the case before trial).
157
Kara Spak, Defense in Brown’s Chicken Case Gets DNA Access, CHI. DAILY HERALD,
Aug. 15, 2006, at 13.
158
Id.
159
See generally Chris Smith, Anatomy of a DNA Match, S.F. MAG., Sept. 2008,
http://www.sanfranmag.com/story/anatomy-dna-match:
In 1997, FBI scientists decided on a predetermined set of 13 loci that is
enough to indicate identity; most experts agree with that standard. It’s
generally believed that only identical twins match at 13, and that the
chances of a coincidental 13-locus match—meaning it’s all a terrible
mistake and the defendant is innocent—is, on average, one in a trillion.
Id.; HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, DNA FORENSICS,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009):
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the Hispanic population was one in 2.8 trillion.160 Inspired by the results
of an Arizona study, Luna wanted the raw data to find convicted felons
who met the nine out of thirteen loci.161
[51] The court fashioned a compromise: the defense was not given access
to the raw data, but the police would have to run a nine-loci analysis.162
An appeal was pursued because the prosecution claimed that running the
study would violate federal and state laws by using the database for an
extra legal purpose.163 The defense countered that it was in the same spirit
as statutorily authorized quality assurance testing of crime laboratories.164
The prosecutors pointed out that smaller public databases (with up to
17,000 profiles) were available for testing.165 According to Luna’s
defense team, this would hardly compare with the 220,000 profiles in the
state database.166
[52] The right to confrontation is directed at the sources of evidence the
prosecutor has marshaled against the defendant—not a second tier
substitute. Courts are always concerned about the authenticity and
originality of evidence, and take pains to exclude hearsay and secondhand
information. Thus, there is no rational basis for shielding the data in the
government’s computer, and relegating the defense to run studies, likely
inadmissible, on private sources that are not fair representations.
To identify individuals, forensic scientists scan 13 DNA regions, or
loci, that vary from person to person and use the data to create a DNA
profile of that individual (sometimes called a DNA fingerprint). There
is an extremely small chance that another person has the same DNA
profile for a particular set of 13 regions.
Id.
160

See Brian Mackey, Court Allows Defendant’s DNA Data Request, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Aug. 15, 2006, at 1.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. Eventually, Luna was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. His case is
currently on appeal. See Eric Herman, Brown’s Murderer Gets Life In Prison, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, at 10; Stacy St. Clair, State Police Lauded For Saving Evidence,
CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 17, 2007, at 21 (“After Luna’s murder trial, jurors said the
DNA evidence played a key role in their decision to convict.”).
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[53] The Arizona study noted above was an important basis for the
defendant’s application in Luna. 167 It arose from a discovery by an
analyst working at the Arizona crime laboratory in 2001.168 She found
two felons who matched at nine of thirteen loci, but was disturbed by a
comparison of their mug shots—one African-American, the other
Caucasian.169 Dozens of similar matches were uncovered.170 This
revelation threatened to undermine the quality of statistical matching
relied on by federal and state authorities and raised the specter of higher
numbers of false matches.171
[54] Since then, the study has spurred defense requests for “Arizona
Searches” as in Luna.172 For example, a San Francisco lawyer defending a
rape case based on a nine-loci match was intrigued enough by the Arizona
study to subpoena new results.173 “Among about 65,000 felons, there
were 122 pairs that matched at nine of 13 loci. Twenty pairs matched at
10 loci. One matched at 11 and one at 12, though both later proved to
belong to relatives.”174 In a Maryland death penalty case the court ordered
a quality assurance test of the state’s DNA database at the defense’s
request.175 “In a database of fewer than 30,000 profiles, 32 pairs matched
at nine or more loci. Three of those pairs were [perfect matches,] identical
at 13 out of 13 loci.”176 Finally, academics and experts have added their
voices in calling for access to the DNA databanks to test the assumptions
of profile rarity.177
167

See Jason Felch & Maura Dolan, Crime Labs Finding Questionable DNA Matches:
FBI Tries to Keep National Database Away from Lawyers, S.F. GATE, Aug. 3, 2008.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. (“At the time, [many] states looked at [only] nine or fewer loci when searching for
suspects. (States now commonly attempt to compare 13 loci, though often fewer are
available from old or contaminated crime scene evidence.)”).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, The Verdict is Out on DNA Profiles, L.A. TIMES, July 20,
2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/20/local/me-dna20.
Bruce Weir, a statistician at the University of Washington who has
studied the issue, said these assumptions should be tested empirically in
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VI. CONFRONTING COMPUTER DATABASE EVIDENCE
[55] Databases can serve as an investigative tool for the defense, as in the
Luna case. They can also be used to challenge database results presented
by the prosecution during its case-in-chief. Here, we must consider the
government’s constitutional burden of proof, the defense’s right to
confrontation, and the limited remedies available under the codes of
procedure. From a due process standpoint, it might be argued that certain
kinds of database evidence, proven unreliable or inaccessible, ought to be
categorically excluded.178
[56] One foundation of a demand by the defense for database discovery is
the right to confront the witnesses against the accused.179 Confronting
database output means questioning the entire system: data collection,
entry, storage, retrieval, analysis and production. Civil litigation ediscovery has shined a light in the dark corners where information can
hide, such as in metadata, and on the need to determine authenticity and
authorship, which can change with each incarnation of a document or data
record.180
the national database system. “Instead of saying we predict there will
be a match, let’s open it up and look,” Weir said. Some experts predict
that given the rapid growth of CODIS, such a search would produce
one or more examples of unrelated people who are identical at all 13
loci.
Id.
178

See generally Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should not be
Based on a Single Piece of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43
(2007) (listing types of evidence prone to such mistakes and proposing future
preventative legislation); Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful
Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Statutes, 37 SW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (citing polygraph evidence as one longstanding example, and
pointing out several categories of evidence proven unreliable in wrongful conviction
cases, such as junk science).
179
Although the right to confrontation has primarily been viewed as a trial right, “there
might well be a confrontation violation if . . . a defendant is denied pretrial access to
information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a crucial
prosecution witness.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61-62 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
180
Metadata in particular can be useful in clarifying the relationships among documents
through pathnames and file storage architecture, version and drafting dates, and the other
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[57] Law enforcement, and particularly government forensic witnesses,
sometimes rely upon analysis and data garnered from institutional
knowledge, and in some cases specialty databases. In a heroin smuggling
case from the early 1980s, the defendant was charged with transporting the
narcotic in caviar tins.181 A chemical analyst employed by the government
testified that the substance recovered was heroin.182 The bases for his
opinion were laboratory tests and computer analysis.183
Crossexamination at trial revealed that “he [the expert] knew nothing about the
computer program which caused the computer to bring forth the
information it produced.”184
[58] The defense made a confrontation clause argument: without
disclosure of the technical information on how the computer worked, they
could not effectively cross-examine the prosecution’s witness.185 The trial
court judge rejected this argument, finding that the defense had ample
information to attack the weight of this expert’s opinion and the technical
information would not have added to it.186 On appeal, the defendant
emphasized the importance and value of obtaining that computer
information pretrial.187 The Seventh Circuit, however, was not persuaded,
and found that the testimony did not introduce “computer printouts or
direct testimony of results.”188 Instead, the expert had relied on
“recognized instrumental techniques involving the use of a computer.”189
In the court’s eyes, the fact that the machinery involved was commercially
or commonly used deflated the defense’s argument.190

points on the information cycle, and this type of nuanced discovery can easily be
overwritten by failure to preserve the evidence in its original format or through
purposeful document scrubbing. See generally Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance
in the Discovery of ESI Since December 1, 2006, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2008)
(proposing ways in which the discovery phase may become more manageable).
181
United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1982).
182
Id. at 176.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 176-77.
187
Id. at 177.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 176-77.
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[59] The direct evidence versus supporting role of computer-generated
evidence test does not carry much weight today. Challenges to the
reliability of computer software governing the operations of some of the
most commonly used forensic technology, such as breathalyzers, have
been gaining momentum and widening the doors of discovery.191
[60] The New Jersey case of State v. Fortin,192 illustrates how far these
developments have come.193 Steven Fortin was among a group of suspects
being investigated in the beating death of a woman who was killed en
route to a local grocery store in Woodbridge.194 At the time, he had been
living nearby.195 His connection to the case did not emerge until months
later, when Maine State Police contacted Woodbridge law enforcement
about Fortin, who was under investigation for sexually assaulting a
trooper.196
191

See Ken Strutin, An Examination of Source Code Evidence, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 2007,
at 5.
Testing and analysis of source codes ought to be allowed to
meet the requirements of due process. Since an accused is entitled to
independently test physical and biological evidence, there is a
compelling and essential need to question the proficiency of the
machines that do the analyzing and measuring. This is particularly
important when the evidence, whether time sensitive or consumed by
examination, no longer exists.
When it comes time to face the output from an analysis by a
computer driven machine, a human being has the right to know whether
the inner workings of that witness are reliable. And every defendant
ought to be entitled to examine those inner workings with the help of an
expert.
These source code cases suggest the need for quality assurance
and proficiency testing of computerized scientific equipment in the
same vein as the protocols for forensic laboratories. Although
sophisticated and impressive, computer programs should be answerable
for their errors.
Id.
192

State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004).
Id. at 999 (denying admissibility of an expert’s testimony without a “reliable
database” as proof of scientific reliability).
194
Id. at 984-86.
195
Id. at 985.
196
Id. at 986.
193
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[61] Without matching genetic material or other forensic evidence, the
police did not have much to connect Fortin to the New Jersey crime,
except for the similarity in the modus operandi.197 The New Jersey
prosecutors called upon the services of a retired FBI agent and “expert in
violent sexual crimes,” Robert R. Hazelwood, to catalog the similarities
between the crimes committed against the New Jersey and Maine
victims.198 At trial he offered an opinion based on comparisons of various
acts and injuries at the two crimes as to motive, modus operandi, and signs
of ritual.199 Hazelwood concluded that he had not seen the same
combination of ritualistic behaviors in his work over the course of his
thirty-year career.200 He also stated that he had never seen the particular
combination of modus operandi and ritualistic behaviors “in any other
crime and I’ve never heard of it and I’ve never read of it.”201
Hazelwood’s testimony was critical to identifying Fortin as the culprit.
His analysis and comparison of the two assaults allowed the jury to infer
that Fortin was responsible in the New Jersey case.202
[62] Before he could testify about his “uniqueness analysis,” the court
ordered Hazelwood to disclose the database of cases that formed the
foundation for his work.203 It was a precondition to admitting evidence of
the methods of his crime comparison techniques and assessing the
reliability of the information upon which he relied.204 The prosecution
argued that the witness drew on his experience in law enforcement and did
not have a list of cases, only the information cited in his curriculum
vitae.205 Still, the admission of his testimony was predicated on the
production of a reliable database for defense examination.206 His resume
was insufficient for that purpose, and the court would not place the burden
on the defense of combing through Hazelwood’s publications and citations
to assemble a database from the 7,000 cases he investigated over his
197

Id.
Id. at 987.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 988.
201
Id.
202
See id. at 998-99.
203
Id. at 999-1000.
204
Id. at 999.
205
Id.
206
Id.
198
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career.207 The expert was in the best position to assemble that
information, and without the database, there was no means for testing his
conclusions at trial.208
[63] The investigative techniques underlying the “uniqueness analysis”
had the “aura of science,” and thus justified subjecting it to the more
rigorous requirements for the admission of scientific evidence.209 New
Jersey’s Rule of Evidence 705210 empowered the judge to order an expert
to reveal his underlying data as a condition of testifying, which the expert
would have to disclose in response to cross-examination as well.211 The
purpose behind the court’s original order was to ensure the reliability of
the database upon which Hazelwood would offer testimony that might
lead the jury to conclude Fortin was responsible.212 The court went on to
describe the contents of this database:
Hazelwood’s database should have consisted of violent
sexual assault cases that he had investigated, studied, or
analyzed during his professional career, and the peculiar
modus operandi and ritualistic characteristics of those
crimes. Such a database would have provided some basis
for verifying the frequency of sexual assaults in which
perpetrators bite the faces or breasts of their victims, or
207

Id. at 1000.
Id. (“We cannot agree with the trial court that Hazelwood’s reference to his
experience, training, and education was a substitute for a ‘database of cases’ or that the
failure to provide such case information only went to the weight to be given to his
opinion, rather than its admissibility.”).
209
Id.
210
New Jersey Law Network, Rule 705: Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert
Opinion; Hypotheses not Necessary, http://www.njlawnet.com/njevidence/705.html:
208

The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be
required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Questions calling for the opinion of an expert witness need not be
hypothetical in form unless the judge in his discretion so requires.
Id.
211
212

Fortin, 843 A.2d at 1001.
See id. at 998-99.
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manually strangle them, or engage in high risk attacks, to
name but a few of the characteristics Hazelwood found
distinctive in this case. If Hazelwood was correct about the
unique combination of characteristics that the Gardner
[Maine victim] and Padilla [N.J. victim] assaults had in
common, the database would have strengthened and
validated his conclusions. The jury also was entitled to
know if there were any flaws in his analysis.213
[64] The appellate judges, however, were not in a position to define the
size of the database, only determining it must allow an “acceptable basis
for comparison.”214 The trial court would have to hold a hearing to make
that assessment.215 They concluded that it was reversible error for
Hazelwood to testify without providing a reliable database to the defense
beforehand.216
[65] In a California case where the police used a sex crimes database to
establish the identity of the defendant through data correlation, the appeals
court did not look kindly on the trial judge's uncritical admission of the
evidence.217 In People v. Hernandez, Kenneth Hernandez was charged
with committing several violent sex crimes involving two different
victims.218 Crime analysis evidence from a police database called
Sherlock219 showed that these cases involving unique modus operandi had
213

Id. at 1002.
Id.
215
Id. (“At that hearing, the trial court must determine what number of cases can be
reconfigured within reason and what number of case comparisons are necessary to give
the opinion validity.”).
216
Id.
217
See People v. Hernandez, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing the
use of a computer system named Sherlock, which the court deemed “pseudo-scientific”
testimony).
218
Id. at 770.
219
Id. at 771. Sherlock is
214

“[A]n in-house database that was developed by crime analysis.
It was defined by the sex crimes unit, variables that we capture in there.
Information that is put into the sex crimes file is from a sex crimes log,
which each case that is assigned to a sex crimes detective has very
specific information that’s put down on a sex crimes log. [¶] In turn,
that log is given to us and we enter it, give it to a clerical support
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not occurred before defendant moved into the searched area or since his
arrest, which was central to his identification.220
[66] The defense opposed admission of the evidence as unscientific and
lacking indicia of reliability, and because no discovery had been
granted.221 Based on the analyst’s testimony, the trial judge let the
evidence in.222 On appeal, however, the court was highly dubious of the
foundations for the reliability of the database:
[T]he challenge here boils down to the basic question of
whether the sources of information for the data base [sic] of
Sherlock’s system “were such as to indicate its
trustworthiness.” As noted earlier, the prosecutor argued
the information in Sherlock was trustworthy because it was
relied upon by the sex crimes detectives on a daily basis to
do their jobs solving sex crimes. Such explanation, which
the trial court apparently accepted, completely ignores the
fact the business records exception has been held
inapplicable to admit police reports into evidence for the
sheer reason such are or might be based upon the
observations of victims and witnesses who have no official
duty to observe and report the relevant facts (citations
omitted). The data base [sic] in Sherlock was taken from
the sex crimes log prepared from the purported “relevant
facts” from original police reports, whatever those may
be.223

person in the crime analysis unit who then enters each item into the
Sherlock system, into the Sherlock sex crimes files.”
The entries to Sherlock were generally done within three to
four days after a reported sex crimes incident.
Id.
220

Id.
Id.
222
Id. at 773.
223
Id. at 778-79 (citations omitted).
221
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The Court of Appeals went on to note that putting information into a
computer does not cloak it in reliability.224 The computer did not have the
power to transform hearsay from police reports into nonhearsay
evidence.225
VII. RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY: RESTORING BALANCE
[67] A level playing field is crucial in the Information Age. Police and
prosecutors have access to a widening array of surveillance tools and data
from consumer and social networking technologies.226 In a Supreme
Court of Louisiana decision from the 1980s, we can observe the
importance of balancing access to information resources, albeit human.227
[68] In Kirk v. State, Philip Kirk, Jr. was charged with mail fraud in
federal court.228 He, along with his attorney, brought an action in state
court for declaratory and injunctive relief over a Louisiana statute that
prohibited him from recording confidential conversations of adverse
witnesses without their consent. 229 At the same time, law enforcement was
free to do so.230 Basically, the defense wanted to prevent the authorities
224

Id. at 779.
Id.
226
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL (2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf (explaining technologies
and procedures).
227
See Kirk v. State, 526 So.2d 223, 226-27 (La. 1988) (reviewing a state court ruling
mooted by defendant’s acquittal in a connected federal criminal action); id. at 227
(Watson, J., concurring) (declaring the case moot from the outset).
228
Id. at 224.
229
Id.; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:322.1(A) (1990):
225

It shall be unlawful for any person, intentionally and without the
consent of all parties to a confidential communication, to eavesdrop
upon or record such confidential communication by means of any
electronic amplifying or recording device, whether such
communication is carried on among such parties in the presence of one
another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device.
Id.
230

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:322.1(D)(3) (1990) (“This Section shall not apply to the
following: . . . A law enforcement agency or any of its authorized agents.”) (emphasis
added).
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from prosecuting him as a result of getting witness statements, necessary
for the defense, in violation of the law.231
[69] The prosecutor already possessed records of conversations between
defendant and these witnesses.232 Kirk and his lawyer claimed that the
statute violated equal protection by exempting police but exposing the
defense to criminal liability.233 The case against Kirk rested on an alleged
plan between defendant and his employees to defraud Photon, Inc., the
corporation for which they worked.234 Law enforcement had used these
employees to record conversations with the defendant to build its case.235
Kirk wanted his investigator to speak with these same witnesses to prepare
an entrapment defense.236
[70] Nothing in the legislative history or case law suggested a justification
for this imbalance. The court concluded:
It is as fundamentally unfair to prohibit a criminal
defendant from obtaining evidence by electronic recording
of conversations when the prosecutor is free to obtain such
evidence by the same method, at least in the absence of any
reasonable basis for the distinction. Inasmuch as La. R.S.
14:322.1 violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional right
to equal protection of the law under both the federal and
state constitutions, the statute cannot stand.237
[71] The accused should be able to use those tools relied upon uniquely
by law enforcement and the prosecution in preparing a defense.
Objections by the government run counter to its use of databases and the
like in meeting its burden of proof.238 The defense is not in the same
position as the state when it comes to marshalling electronic resources.239
231

Kirk, 526 So.2d at 224.
Id. at 224.
233
Id. at 225-26.
234
Id. at 225.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 227.
238
Cf. United States v. Sheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 337-38 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
232
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[72] These reciprocal discovery and disclosure obligations are firmly
rooted in the right to present a defense. In Wardius v. Oregon,240 the
Supreme Court overturned a conviction due to an invidious state alibi
evidence rule that did not allow the defense reciprocal discovery of the
state’s rebuttal witnesses. 241 Describing discovery as a “two-way street,”
Justice Marshall made this point about due process:
The State may not insist that trials be run as a “search for
truth” so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while
maintaining “poker game” secrecy for its own witnesses. It
is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge
the details of his own case while at the same time
subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning
refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed
to the State.242
[73] In footnote nine of its opinion, the Court anticipated the problem
defendants today face in seeking discovery of government database
information, while the defendant’s computerized data may already be
known or uncovered through investigation by the prosecution.243
It is incongruous for the party that selected the [polygraph] examiner,
the equipment, the testing procedures, and the questions asked of the
defendant to complain about the examinee’s burden of proving that the
test was properly conducted. While there may well be a need for
substantial collateral proceedings when the party objecting to
admissibility has a basis for questioning some aspect of the
examination, it seems quite obvious that the Government is in no
position to challenge the competence of the procedures that it has
developed and relied upon in hundreds of thousands of cases.
Id.; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (“Just as a State may not apply an arbitrary
rule of competence to exclude a material defense witness from taking the stand, it also
may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand, but arbitrarily
excludes material portions of his testimony.”).
239
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE AND TECHNOLOGY: A
PROGRESS REPORT (1999), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/179003.pdf (studying the
"disparities in resources and technological expertise" in public defense offices).
240
412 U.S. 470 (1973).
241
Id. at 472.
242
Id. at 475-76.
243
See id. at 476 n.9.
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Specifically, the Court noted: “Indeed, the State’s inherent informationgathering advantages suggest that if there is to be any imbalance in
discovery rights, it should work in the defendant’s favor.”244
[74] The Court has stressed that the Constitution will trump a state
evidence rule that denies a defendant the right to present his case or
challenge the evidence. In Chambers v. Mississippi,245 a hearsay rule that
prevented introduction of exculpatory evidence of third party guilt
violated due process;246 and a rule barring a co-participant’s testimony in
Washington v. Texas,247 which would have allowed the prosecution to
present that evidence, ran afoul of the compulsory process clause.248
244
245

Id.
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973):
Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected or more
frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of
hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of evidence
which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. The
testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of
trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the
exception for declarations against interest. That testimony also was
critical to Chambers’ defense. In these circumstances, where
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to
defeat the ends of justice.

Id.
246

In defense of a murder indictment, Leon Chambers wanted to call a man who had
confessed the killing as well as the witnesses who heard his statement. The state’s
voucher rule prevented him from impeaching his own witness, and the testimony of the
other witnesses to the admissions was hearsay. Id. at 289-90. The Supreme Court did
not allow the defendant to be deprived of an opportunity to present his case due to an
overly restrictive state rule of evidence. Id. at 302.
247
388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967):
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense,
the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the
prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as
an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his
own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law.
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[75] Both cases illustrate the constitutional imperatives behind a
defendant’s right to marshal evidence in his favor, albeit outside the
restrictions of inequitable state evidentiary rules. Restrictions on
accessing government databases due to privilege and privacy arguments
cannot reasonably overcome due process and compulsory process
mandates. The contents of a database, like an alternate suspect’s
confession to witnesses or the admissions of a convicted co-defendant, can
be relevant to innocence and cast doubt on the strength of the
prosecution’s case. The collective knowledge embodied in government
resources stand behind police and forensic witnesses, and indirectly serves
as testimony against the accused. Basic fairness demands that these
databases also be called into service for the defense.
VIII. CONCLUSION
[76] At one time, when it was possible for a human being to master the
entire sum of knowledge in a field, such a person became an expert, a
living database. It is no longer realistic for any individual to match the
speed, size and sheer power of computer-based information. Law
enforcement and forensic experts rely on these resources to conduct
investigations, make comparisons, identify suspects and prepare cases for
court. Their findings are inextricably bound to the information contained
in these knowledge banks. As a matter of fairness, a defendant should be
entitled to examine that same information to test its accuracy and
reliability. In addition, defendants should be permitted access to the same
tools to conduct their own investigations and prepare their cases.

Id.
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Jackie Washington wanted to call his co-defendant in the crime, who had already pled
guilty and had been sentenced to fifty years in prison, to exculpate him. The Texas rule
at the time would not allow it. His attempt to introduce exculpatory evidence was kept
out by a rule whose foundations were unsupportable. See id. at 16-17. Compulsory
process was a firmly established right and entitled Washington to produce exonerating
evidence in his defense. See id. at 23.
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[77] The complexity of the law249 is mirrored by the staggering size,
growth and depth of computer-generated data.250 In the Information Age,
it is inevitable that digitally-based output will lionize the evidence
assembled by law enforcement in the prosecution of crime. As a result,
the defense will labor under the heavy burdens of challenging
presumptions of reliability and the aura of infallibility surrounding
electronic data. Routine access to forensic databases and government
expertise, or comparable resources, remains beyond the pale for most if
not all defendants, regardless of their financial standing. While our justice
system recognizes the strategic information advantage possessed by the
prosecution, it has yet to adjust the playing field. Ultimately, the
foundational principles of the Constitution and the lessons drawn from the
civil side of the legal system will be called upon to offer guidance in the
continued development of criminal e-discovery.

249

See generally Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic
Conduct, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Apr. 7, 2003,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/upload/40268_1.pdf:
Estimates of the current size of the body of federal criminal law vary.
It has been reported that the Congressional Research Service cannot
even count the current number of federal crimes. The American Bar
Association reported in 1998 that there were in excess of 3,300 separate
criminal offenses. More than 40 percent of these laws have been
enacted in just the past 30 years, as part of the growth of the regulatory
state. And these laws are scattered in over 50 titles of the United States
Code, encompassing roughly 27,000 pages. Worse yet, the statutory
code sections often incorporate, by reference, the provisions and
sanctions of administrative regulations promulgated by various
regulatory agencies under congressional authorization. Estimates of
how many such regulations exist are even less well settled, but the
ABA thinks there are “[n]early 10,000.”

Id. (footnotes omitted).
SCHOOL OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? (2003),
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info2003/printable_report.pdf (“In 1997, the largest database was Knight Ridder’s DIALOG,
a text database, with 7 terabytes of storage, according to SearchDatabase.com. As of
2002, the world’s largest database is at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center which
stores 500 terabytes of experiment data.”).
250

43

